Superb Motors Inc. v. Deo
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York · E.D.N.Y. · New York bar guidance
Conduct
Here an attorney appearing pro se as a defendant filed an opposition citing two non-existent cases, then blamed computer malware and denied using AI.
Consequence
$1,500 Rule 11 sanction payable to the court registry; the court declined a grievance referral.
Lesson
Here the court held that a malware explanation did not excuse the attorney's failure to confirm his citations before filing.
Verified September 30, 2026
- Citation
- Superb Motors Inc. v. Deo, No. 23-CV-6188 (JMW), Memorandum and Order (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2026) (Wicks, M.J.), ECF No. 492
- Decided
- April 30, 2026
Summary
Harry R. Thomasson, a New York-admitted attorney, is a defendant in this case, which the court notes is nearing its 500th docket entry. The court had earlier disqualified him under the advocate-witness rule from representing a group of co-defendants and himself, and he then appeared pro se. His opposition (ECF No. 353) to the Superb Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the preliminary injunction contained non-existent case citations. The Superb Plaintiffs' reply identified one, "In re Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 85 A.D.3d 1510 (3rd Dept. 2011)," and the court "independently found [...] with little effort" a second, "In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 56, 60 (2nd Cir. 1974)". The court issued a sua sponte order to show cause under Rule 11 on April 20, 2026. In a declaration responding to it (ECF No. 484), Thomasson called the filing "an innocent mistake," stated that he "do[es] not use AI," attributed the citations to computer "viruses and malware," said he "was completely fooled by whoever infiltrated [his] computer," and attached Staples documents showing antivirus programs were installed and virus threats found. The court noted that the response did not show that he had verified the two citations.
- AI tool:
- Unidentified (the court describes the two citations as AI-generated; Thomasson declared that he does not use AI, blamed viruses and malware on his computer, and identified Google as one of his research tools)
- Sanction amount:
- $1,500 payable into the Registry of the Court by May 15, 2026; grievance referral declined
What sanction did the court impose?
Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks held that relying on "AI-generated content that created fictitious legal citations" violated Rule 11 and imposed a $1,500 monetary sanction, payable by Thomasson into the Registry of the Court by May 15, 2026. Because the sanction was raised sua sponte, the court set out the subjective bad-faith standard and quoted authority that "[c]ourts in this circuit have repeatedly found that presenting AI-generated hallucinations as valid caselaw constitutes subjective bad faith." It declined to apply the more lenient standard some courts use for pro se litigants because Thomasson is an attorney, and held that the Staples antivirus records he submitted "do[] not negate an attorney's responsibility to confirm his or her work." It set the amount at the lower end because Thomasson acknowledged the severity of using AI-generated citations and said he would be vigilant going forward. The court declined to refer him to a grievance committee, finding "nothing in the record to indicate that Thomasson 'knowingly' made a false representation of law in violation of NYRPC 3.3."
Why does Superb Motors Inc. v. Deo matter for law firms using AI?
Superb Motors applies Rule 11 to a lawyer litigating his own position. Thomasson had been disqualified from representing himself and a group of co-defendants under the advocate-witness rule, and he continued in the case pro se. Magistrate Judge Wicks acknowledged that “some courts have held pro se litigants to a lower standard when facing the instant issue,” but held that “as Thomasson is an attorney, that standard should not be lowered.” The order grounds the duty in both Rule 11 and the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, quoting Rule 1.1’s comment on keeping abreast of “the benefits and risks associated with technology the lawyer uses.”
The response to the show-cause order is the unusual feature. Thomasson declared that he does not use AI and attributed the two citations to viruses and malware, supported by Staples service records. The court held that he had relied on AI-generated content and, in the alternative, that “[e]ven assuming ‘viruses and malware’ infected his Google searches, what is absent is that Thomasson confirmed all citations prior to submitting his opposition with the Court,” and that the malware records “do[] not negate an attorney’s responsibility to confirm his or her work and comply with all the relevant rules.”
The sanction was calibrated low. The court surveyed a $1,000 to $5,000 range in comparable cases and set $1,500, crediting that Thomasson acknowledged the severity of AI-generated citations and would be vigilant going forward, and it declined a grievance referral on the ground that nothing showed a knowing false statement under NYRPC 3.3. Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that, in this order, the explanation for a bad citation mattered less than whether the lawyer could show the citation had been checked.
Implications for your firm
Operational steps a firm reading this case may wish to consider documenting. Strategic and rule-application calls belong to your firm's attorneys.
- Verify every citation before filing, including in matters where a lawyer appears for himself. The court declined to apply the more lenient pro se standard because Thomasson is an attorney.
- Document the verification step itself. The court noted that Thomasson made no effort to show he had verified the two cases and held that the antivirus records did not negate his responsibility to confirm his work.
- Consider that a grievance referral and a monetary sanction can turn on different standards. Here the court found nothing showing a knowing misstatement under NYRPC 3.3 and declined a referral, while still imposing a monetary sanction under Rule 11.