Henry County Schools v. Grant

What did the court warn about?

The panel imposed no sanction. It wrote that "we must, yet again, remind counsel, and lower courts, of their professional responsibilities and obligations in the use of artificial intelligence." On the merits, it reversed the denial of the motions to dismiss as to the state law claims against all defendants (barred by sovereign immunity or failing to state a claim) and vacated the order as to the Title VII claims against the school district. On the Title VII question the court held that the trial court's order "contains no analysis of the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue nor factual findings" on the arm-of-the-State factors, and that "[t]he trial court's summary conclusion, coupled with the errors identified above, hampers our ability to reach the merits." It remanded "for reconsideration under the proper standards and bona fide case law," citing Payne's remand for reconsideration without hallucinated cases. Judgment line: "Judgments reversed in part; vacated in part; and cases remanded with direction." Judge Markle wrote the opinion; Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Hodges concurred. The court's docket for No. A26A0698 shows a motion for reconsideration filed by the appellee on June 22, 2026 and denied on July 1, 2026.

Why does Henry County Schools v. Grant matter for law firms using AI?

Henry County Schools v. Grant is an appellate decision about a hallucinated citation that entered the record through a proposed order rather than a brief. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reviewed a trial court order denying motions to dismiss three principals’ employment suits and found that the order, “which was drafted by the plaintiffs’ attorney,” cited federal motion-to-dismiss law, confused constitutional claims with employment discrimination, ignored binding Georgia precedent, misquoted cases it cited, and “relies on at least one hallucinated case.” The panel directed its criticism at both participants: it found it “troubling that counsel submitted such an order to the trial court, and regrettable that the trial court failed to identify any of these errors.”

The opinion does not sanction anyone and does not find that AI was used. It places the order in the line of Payne v. State, where the Supreme Court of Georgia sanctioned counsel who prepared an order citing hallucinated cases, and quotes Slay v. Ross that hallucinated cases are “typically a hallmark of the irresponsible use of regenerative artificial intelligence (A.I.) in legal drafting.” The panel then wrote that “we must, yet again, remind counsel, and lower courts, of their professional responsibilities and obligations in the use of artificial intelligence.”

The practical consequence fell on the merits. The plaintiffs had won the denial of the motions below. On appeal, the state law claims were reversed on immunity and pleading grounds, and the Title VII ruling was vacated because the order contained no Eleventh Amendment analysis or arm-of-the-State findings, a “summary conclusion” that, “coupled with the errors identified above,” hampered its ability to reach the merits; the court remanded “for reconsideration under the proper standards and bona fide case law.” Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider applying the same verification protocol to proposed orders, findings and judgments that they apply to briefs, since a court that adopts counsel’s draft adopts its citations too.