Akerlund v. Atlas Air, Inc.

How did the court address the AI-related conduct?

In a published opinion by Judge Grant, the panel affirmed the dismissal of the third amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Flight Services International and for failure to state a claim against Atlas Air. In Part V, the Court held that "completely outsourcing one's legal work to artificial intelligence software is not competent," called it "a dramatic violation of the client's interests," and concluded that by signing briefs filled with hallucinated citations "not once but twice," Sabatini "violated his professional obligations, both to his clients and to this Court." It stated that "[i]n a separate order, this Court, through the Chief Judge, will refer the matter to the Committee on Lawyer Qualifications and Conduct," citing 11th Cir. Rules, Addendum 8, Rule 2(C). The opinion itself imposes no monetary sanction, fee award, or strike.

Why does Akerlund v. Atlas Air, Inc. matter for law firms using AI?

Akerlund is a merits affirmance with a disciplinary coda, and the coda is written for other lawyers to read. Judge Grant opens the opinion by explaining why it is “more candid than usual” about the weakness of the claims: “because the plaintiffs’ counsel Anthony F. Sabatini has not been candid with us.” The opinion then saves its account of the briefing “for last,” describing it as “blatant and repeated misconduct” of a kind that is “rare to see.”

The facts in Part V are what make the case distinctive. The opening brief relied on at least eight hallucinated cases. When the defendants pointed this out, counsel’s untimely proposed reply acknowledged that the citations were “erroneous or unverifiable” and listed eight cases he was withdrawing. None of the eight matched the hallucinated cases in the opening brief, and all eight of them were hallucinated too. A footnote adds that one case appeared in both filings but was attributed to a different court in the reply.

The Court’s reasoning rests on competence and on the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court. It cited Model Rule 1.1 and ABA Formal Opinion 512 for the proposition that “completely outsourcing one’s legal work to artificial intelligence software is not competent,” and it explained what is lost when a lawyer “is willing to sign his name on whatever a machine churns out without so much as checking it for accuracy.” “Whatever the merits of artificial intelligence,” the Court wrote, “it is no substitute for actual intelligence.” When lawyers use AI tools, “there is no way to get around the obligation to verify that the software got it right.” Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that the remedy here was a published, named rebuke and a referral, not a fine.