Donaghy v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of North Kingstown

What did the court warn about?

Justice Lanphear granted the appeal on a different ground: the Board had closed public comment after the first hearing, then took new testimony at the second hearing, including a landscape expert's, without reopening comment; the court found Ms. Donaghy was denied due process and that the town ordinance also required more. The Board's decision was vacated and the matter remanded for a continued, reopened public hearing. The court did not reach the accessory-use argument. On the citations, it imposed no sanction. It wrote that "[w]hether it is a short deadline, the rise of artificial intelligence, or a simple error, this leaves the Court doubting all that is said by counsel," and that "[t]he Court reserves its right to take further action but goes no further today other than to express its dissatisfaction at the presentation of an argument which appears to be the product of, at best, recklessness." It then quoted Mattox v. Product Innovations Research, LLC (E.D. Okla. 2025) on the lawyer's duty for what generative technology writes. No order to show cause, fee award, or referral appears in the decision.

Why does Donaghy v. Zoning Board of Review of the Town of North Kingstown matter for law firms using AI?

Donaghy is a zoning appeal decided on procedural due process, with the citation problem addressed in a footnote attached to arguments the court chose not to reach. Justice Lanphear held that the North Kingstown Zoning Board, having closed public comment after its first hearing, received new expert and applicant testimony at the second hearing and should have reopened the hearing before voting. That was enough to vacate the permit and remand. The court then noted that it would not address Ms. Donaghy’s remaining arguments, including her contention that the Board misclassified the solar array as an accessory use.

In footnote 2 the court nonetheless commented on that briefing. It observed “with great concern” that the appellant’s discussion of the definition of “accessory” contained “quotations of nonexistent law.” Both cited Rhode Island Supreme Court cases exist, the court said, “but have nothing to do with the question presented.” The sentence quoted from page 942 of Town of Smithfield v. Fanning “does not appear anywhere else in the case,” and Duffy v. Milder concerns a horse stable and equestrian center, not a photography business in a residential area. The court called the citations “inaccurate and misleading” and wrote that, whatever the cause, “this leaves the Court doubting all that is said by counsel.”

The court did not decide the cause. It listed “a short deadline, the rise of artificial intelligence, or a simple error” as possibilities, reserved its right to take further action, and went “no further today other than to express its dissatisfaction at the presentation of an argument which appears to be the product of, at best, recklessness.” It closed the footnote with a passage from Mattox v. Product Innovations Research, LLC, stating that generative technology “cannot attach courage, sincerity, truth, or responsibility to what it writes.” Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that, here, the court’s reaction to the quotations of nonexistent law extended to its confidence in counsel’s whole submission, even though the client won the appeal on other grounds.