Wilt v. Department of the Navy

What did the court warn about?

The court held that Wilt's "citation to hallucinatory cases likely generated via AI violates this Court's Local Rule CV-11(g)," that a pro se litigant "remains bound by the Court's rules and the standards articulated under Rule 11," and that her "false statement of law in her objections is sanctionable and provides no basis to cure her jurisdictional defects . . . ." It then warned: "The Court cautions Plaintiff that fabricated citations will not be tolerated." No sanction was imposed. On the merits, the court overruled all five objections (FTCA exhaustion, the FTCA's intentional-tort exception, the Tucker Act, Title VII, and private rights of action under the cited statutes), adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granted the motion to dismiss, and dismissed Wilt's claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Why does Wilt v. Department of the Navy matter for law firms using AI?

Wilt v. Department of the Navy is a jurisdictional dismissal with a separate section on citations. Most of the order walks through Wilt’s five objections to the magistrate judge’s report: she had not exhausted FTCA remedies, the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception barred her misrepresentation and deceit theories, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act over what were essentially money claims, her Title VII claim was not brought against the head of the department, two of the statutes she invoked (42 U.S.C. § 10402 and the Inspector General Act of 1978) create no private right of action, and her Bivens and APA theories were raised for the first time in her objections. Each objection was overruled.

Part II of the order addresses two cases she cited. The court checked both reporter citations, found unrelated decisions at each, and could not locate cases with the names she gave. It concluded that neither case exists and that both “appear to have been generated by artificial intelligence.” The order then took two steps. It described Local Rule CV-11(g), quoting Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., as making clear that “generative artificial intelligence tools may produce factual and legal inaccuracies and reminds attorneys that they must verify the information that they submit to the court.” And it extended that duty to Wilt: “Just like an attorney, a pro se litigant remains bound by the Court’s rules and the standards articulated under Rule 11.”

The consequence is a warning, not a sanction. The court called the false statement of law “sanctionable,” declined to let it cure the jurisdictional defects, and closed the section with a caution that “fabricated citations will not be tolerated.” The same plaintiff appears to have litigated a separate case against the Whitehouse Independent School District (Wilt v. Whitehouse ISD): both orders name the plaintiff as Miranda Wilt proceeding pro se, both cases are in the Tyler Division, and both were before District Judge Kernodle.