Parrish v. Miller
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana · S.D. Ind. · Indiana bar guidance
Conduct
Pro se plaintiffs cited two purported S.D. Ind. decisions in Rule 59(e) motion that the court found egregiously miscited or nonexistent.
Consequence
Rule 59(e) motion denied on merits. Action closed. No sanction; AI-citation footnote referencing HoosierVac and Tsupko.
Lesson
Chief Judge Pratt now folds AI-citation analogies into Rule 59(e) denials by footnote, even without an affirmative AI finding.
Verified May 7, 2026
- Citation
- Parrish v. Miller, No. 1:25-cv-00429-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2025) (Pratt, C.J.)
- Decided
- July 18, 2025
Summary
Pro se plaintiffs Daniel Gene Parrish and Hollie Ann Parrish moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend Chief Judge Tanya Walton Pratt's prior dismissal of their Section 1983 action arising out of an Indiana Department of Child Services proceeding. In support, they cited two purported S.D. Ind. decisions, "Smith v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, No. 1:15-cv-00123-JMS-MJD, 2016 WL 1070607" and "Hernandez v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, No. 1:14-cv-00457-TWP-DKL, 2015 WL 13309206." Judge Pratt found that "after a thorough search, it appears that the cited decisions from this court ... are either egregiously miscited or simply do not exist." A footnote noted the Court has "recently admonished and sanctioned parties for submitting briefs containing miscited or non-existent cases," citing the HoosierVac sanction (recommending $15,000 against an attorney) and the Tsupko admonishment of a pro se plaintiff. The Rule 59(e) motion was denied on the merits.
- AI tool:
- Implied (court did not affirmatively identify AI use; cited cases either egregiously miscited or do not exist)
What sanction did the court impose?
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment denied. Action remains closed. Pro se plaintiffs implicitly cautioned about AI-fabricated citations through the court's footnote referencing HoosierVac and Tsupko. No monetary sanction.
Why does Parrish v. Miller matter for law firms using AI?
Parrish v. Miller is procedurally a routine Rule 59(e) denial in a Section 1983 action that Chief Judge Tanya Walton Pratt had already dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Younger abstention, sovereign and judicial immunity, domestic-relations exception). The substantive ruling is unremarkable: the Parrishes’ motion did not identify any manifest error of law or fact, did not present new evidence, and largely re-argued positions the court had already considered.
What makes Parrish notable for an Indiana federal practice is footnote 2, where Judge Pratt observes that the Parrishes’ cited Seventh Circuit decisions on sovereign immunity (Doe v. Heck and Brokaw v. Mercer County) “do not support the Parrishes’ position,” and that two purported S.D. Ind. decisions on which they relied “are either egregiously miscited or simply do not exist.” The footnote then references HoosierVac (recommending a $15,000 sanction against an attorney for nonexistent cites) and Tsupko (admonishing a pro se plaintiff for the same conduct). Judge Pratt did not impose sanctions in Parrish, but the citation pattern signals the AI-fabricated-case diagnostic is now baseline analytical material in S.D. Ind. orders, even when the merits ruling does not turn on it.
For a firm with S.D. Ind. matters, the operational implication is that AI-citation footnotes will accumulate in published orders even in routine procedural denials. Each footnote becomes part of the docket and increases the likelihood that future judges and opposing counsel will scrutinize cite quality in subsequent filings. Junior staff handling Rule 59(e), Rule 60(b), and similar collateral motions under time pressure should be trained that these are exactly the filings where AI-assisted shortcuts are most likely to surface in a published order.
Implications for your firm
Operational steps a firm reading this case may wish to consider documenting. Strategic and rule-application calls belong to your firm's attorneys.
- Train staff that S.D. Ind. judges are now systematically referencing the HoosierVac and Tsupko sanctions in footnotes when defective citations appear, even in routine motion denials. The footnote becomes part of the public record.
- Document any cite-verification process the firm uses for post-judgment motions; Rule 59(e) and similar collateral filings are a known failure mode for AI-assisted research because they are time-pressured and often handled by junior staff.
- Consider whether the firm's IDCS-related practice (Section 1983, Younger abstention) should include a verification step specifically for older S.D. Ind. and Seventh Circuit cases on sovereign and judicial immunity, since those are the doctrinal areas where the Parrish citations failed.
Sources
Primary sources
- The court did not affirmatively label the citation defect an AI hallucination; the footnote frame implies it by analogizing to HoosierVac (where AI use was found) and Tsupko (where AI use was specifically cautioned). Whether the Parrishes used AI is not on the record.
- Whether the cited cases are partially miscited or wholly fabricated is not fully resolved in the order; Judge Pratt's language is `egregiously miscited or simply do not exist,` leaving both interpretations open.