Mark Lillard v. Offit Kurman, P.A.
Delaware Superior Court, New Castle County · Del. Super. Ct. · Delaware bar guidance
Verified May 14, 2026
- Citation
- Lillard v. Offit Kurman, P.A., No. N24C-10-001 DJB (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2025) (Brennan, J.)
- Decided
- March 12, 2025
Summary
Mark Lillard, proceeding pro se, sued the law firm Offit Kurman, P.A. in Delaware Superior Court. Ruling on the firm's motion to dismiss, Judge Danielle J. Brennan found four problem citations in Lillard's briefing: Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., which involved an accountant rather than an attorney; a Dow Chemical and Organik Kimya citation paired with a quotation the opinion does not contain; a "Spence v. Spence" the court could not locate as cited; and E.E.C. v. E.J.C., a 1983 divorce case unrelated to Lillard's claims. Lillard acknowledged that generative AI was used in preparing the filing.
- AI tool:
- Unidentified (the plaintiff acknowledged using generative AI to prepare his filing; no specific tool or platform named)
What sanction did the court impose?
The court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and gave Lillard leave to file an amended complaint. It imposed no monetary sanction. Instead, it ordered that going forward, any filing in the case by either party must include a certification: a definition of generative AI, identification of the platform used, identification of the sections of the filing where it was used, and a statement that all generative-AI output had undergone human review for accuracy.
Why does Mark Lillard v. Offit Kurman, P.A. matter for law firms using AI?
Lillard v. Offit Kurman is useful less for what the court did to the litigant than for the rule it built. Lillard, suing a law firm pro se, acknowledged using generative AI, and Judge Brennan identified four citations that did not hold up: a case about an accountant offered for a proposition about attorneys, a quotation that did not appear in the opinion it was attributed to, a “Spence v. Spence” the court could not match to anything as cited, and a 1983 divorce case with no bearing on the claims.
The remedy is the part worth filing away. The court did not sanction Lillard. It denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, let him replead, and then imposed a standing certification requirement on every future filing in the case, by either party. The certification has to name the AI platform, identify which sections used it, and confirm human review of the output. For a firm with Delaware Superior Court matters, Lillard is an early example of a judge converting an AI-citation incident into a docket-specific disclosure rule rather than a one-time penalty, and doing it in a way that binds the represented party too.