Kalonji v. State

What did the court warn about?

In a memorandum decision by Senior Judge Crone, with Judges Vaidik and Bradford concurring, the court said it could deem Kalonji's remaining issue waived but found "it sufficient to admonish him for his ghost citations and mischaracterization of caselaw," and cautioned him "against using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated," quoting its earlier decision in Williams v. Kirch. No monetary or other sanction was imposed. By separate order the court denied his Motion for Judicial Notice of Legislative Facts and Alternative Relief, and it declined to review his constitutional claims, which rested on public-records responses outside the record. On the merits it affirmed, holding that because the petition did not attach the prosecuting attorney's written consent required for his offense, the trial court was permitted to deny it summarily without a hearing. It also denied his request for appellate costs. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(D), the memorandum decision is not binding precedent.

Why does Kalonji v. State matter for law firms using AI?

Kalonji is an unpublished memorandum decision in which the Court of Appeals of Indiana treated a pro se litigant’s citation errors under the rule that “pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” The defects the court identified were a quotation from a real Indiana Supreme Court decision that “appears to be fabricated,” a mischaracterization of that same decision, a reporter citation that “does not correspond to any published decision of this Court,” and, in the trial court petition rather than the briefs, a reference to a statute section that does not exist. From the brief citations, “citations to nonexistent legal authorities and to authentic legal authorities that do not support the propositions that he claims they do,” the court drew an inference, not a finding: “it is likely that Kalonji used generative artificial intelligence (AI) to draft his briefs, either in whole or in part.”

The court quoted its earlier decision in Williams v. Kirch that “[c]itations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide” and that “[c]ourts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for including them in briefs,” and that “[j]udges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.” It said waiver of the remaining issue was available, but it found “it sufficient to admonish him for his ghost citations and mischaracterization of caselaw” and reached the merits, affirming the summary denial of his expungement petition.

Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider the two distinct defects here: the nonexistent Taylor citation, and the misdescribed Monfort holding. The second involved a real case, which a check for existence alone would not have caught.