Matter of Julien v. Arthur

What sanction did the court impose?

In a published opinion and order by Justice Wooten (Duffy, J.P., and Landicino and Quirk, JJ., concurring), the Second Department held "that the unverified usage of GenAI to draft an appellate brief containing false information constitutes frivolous conduct warranting the imposition of a sanction, even when the offending party is a pro se litigant." Citing a nonexistent case as the sole support for a claim was frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c)(1) and asserted false material statements under (c)(3). Weighing that only one fabricated case was cited, that the father did not persist after notice, that he acknowledged responsibility, and that he is pro se, the court imposed a $250 sanction, to be deposited with the Clerk within 20 days of service, and cautioned "that any misuse of GenAI in future filings may result in a greater sanction." On the merits, it affirmed the custody order, stating it drew no unfavorable inference from the father's reliance on GenAI.

Why does Matter of Julien v. Arthur matter for law firms using AI?

Julien v. Arthur is the Second Department’s first opinion on generative AI in appellate briefs, and it announces its holding at the outset: “the unverified usage of GenAI to draft an appellate brief containing false information constitutes frivolous conduct warranting the imposition of a sanction, even when the offending party is a pro se litigant.” The court identified GenAI use from the brief itself. Besides a citation to a nonexistent First Department decision, the brief contained, in four places, bracketed language stating that “Appellant” was to provide information, such as “[Appellant to provide specific details of the alleged false facts and the other case].”

The opinion surveys the other Departments before setting the sanction. It describes the First Department’s decisions in Dowlah v Professional Staff Congress and NewRez LLC v Morton, in which the First Department cautioned (Dowlah) or declined to sanction (NewRez) pro se litigants, and its public censure of an attorney in Matter of Zareh. It contrasts the Third Department’s Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v LeTennier, which imposed $7,500 on counsel and $2,500 on the party after 23 fabricated cases across multiple filings, and it quotes LeTennier’s list of relevant factors: the number of fake cases or propositions, fake quotes, persistence after notice, admission, remorse, and impact on the proceedings. Applying them, the court found the father’s conduct “far less egregious” (one fake case, no repetition, prompt acknowledgment) but held that “[t]he failure to verify even a single GenAI citation to a fictitious case may warrant the imposition of sanctions,” both to account for wasted resources and “to deter future frivolous conduct by other pro se litigants and attorneys.”

The result, a $250 sanction under Part 130 and a warning, is modest, but the holding is what matters for practitioners in the Second Department. The court also separated the sanction from the merits, stating that it drew no unfavorable inference from the father’s GenAI use in deciding the custody appeal. Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that the Second Department treats even a single fabricated citation, left unverified, as conduct that may warrant sanctions, and here weighed the response after notice in setting the amount.