Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel. Shona L. Williams v. Samuel R. Lee, II

What did the court warn about?

The majority held that the fabricated citation meant Lee "again violates supreme court rules, commits sanctionable conduct," and that it had discretion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(a) to dismiss the appeal or strike part of the brief. It had already decided, despite the brief's Rule 341 defects, that the issues were discernible, the facts on the birth-expense issue were "not complicated," its understanding of the child-support facts was "aided but not dependent upon" the Department's brief, and reaching the merits served judicial economy. As to the fabricated citation, it said only that "in our discretion, we elect to reach the merits," citing a First District order "declining to dismiss or strike portions of a brief due to AI violations where the issues are simple." On the merits Lee partly prevailed: the court reversed the circuit court's blanket exclusion of vacation and holiday time from the overnight calculation, affirmed the income determination on waiver grounds, vacated the $5,957.55 birth-expense reimbursement as lacking an evidentiary basis, and remanded. No sanction was imposed. Justice Holdridge dissented, stating that the nonexistent case was "conduct sanctionable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(a)" and "contrary to our supreme court's policy on artificial intelligence," and that he "would exercise that discretion, strike respondent's brief, and dismiss the appeal."

Why does Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel. Shona L. Williams v. Samuel R. Lee, II matter for law firms using AI?

This order is a close illustration of how much turns on discretion after a hallucinated citation. The majority held that the only case in the brief was nonexistent and that citing it “commits sanctionable conduct,” quoting the Illinois Supreme Court’s AI policy that “[s]elf-represented litigants are accountable for their final work product. All users must thoroughly review AI-generated content before submitting it in any court proceeding to ensure accuracy and compliance with legal and ethical obligations.” It then chose to decide the appeal anyway, citing a First District order that declined to dismiss or strike portions of a brief for AI violations where the issues were simple.

That choice mattered to the outcome. On the merits, the Third District agreed with Lee that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding all vacation and holiday time from the overnight calculation, reversed that part of the order, and vacated the birth-expense reimbursement for lack of evidentiary support. Justice Holdridge, in dissent, would have struck the brief and dismissed the appeal, reasoning that “the obligation of compliance is shared by attorneys and self-represented litigants alike.”

The majority’s AI language is framed as a possibility, not a finding: the case “appears either entirely fabricated by Samuel or hallucinated through his improper use of generative artificial intelligence … .” Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that a single unverified citation left a partly successful appeal dependent on the panel’s discretion, with one of three judges prepared to dismiss it.