Gully v. Varghese
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany County · N.Y. Sup. Ct. · New York bar guidance
Conduct
Here a pro se plaintiff cited three nonexistent Third Department decisions in her summary judgment papers and repeated them in reply.
Consequence
Here the court denied her summary judgment motion and struck the papers with the false citations; it declined a fine given her pro se status.
Lesson
Here the court held that a self-represented party must read the authorities she cites, and noted a Google search would have exposed these.
Verified September 28, 2026
- Citation
- Gully v. Varghese, 2026 NY Slip Op 50864(U), 89 Misc 3d 1208(A), Index No. 900514-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany County May 12, 2026) (Weinstein, J.)
- Decided
- May 12, 2026
Summary
Frances T. Gully, representing herself, sued her neighbors Anil Varghese and Rini Anil in Albany County Supreme Court over the alleged destruction of fencing, trees, and underwood along their shared property line, asserting claims under RPAPL 861, trespass, and conversion. In her memorandum supporting summary judgment she argued that "[t]he Third Department has repeatedly held that proof of ownership, a survey, and unauthorized cutting establishes liability as a matter of law," citing three purported Third Department decisions: Miller v Rau, Crammer v Spada, and Rockwell v Depart. She repeated the same three citations in her reply. Defendants' counsel pointed out in a reply affirmation that the cases do not exist and noted the court could impose Part 130 sanctions sua sponte. Given leave to file a sur-reply, Gully acknowledged the cases do not exist but said she included them without knowing they were inaccurate and that her conduct was not frivolous. The court found the cases were "indeed, fabrications," noting that the case names appear to mimic real Third Department parties but those rulings concern entirely different matters and the citations themselves are fake.
- AI tool:
- Unidentified (the court found the cited cases "appear to be 'hallucinations' created by an artificial intelligence tool"; no tool named)
- Sanction amount:
- Non-monetary: plaintiff's summary judgment motion denied and the submissions containing the false citations struck; no fine
What sanction did the court impose?
Justice David A. Weinstein found that "imposition of a sanction on plaintiff is appropriate here." Relying on the court's inherent power, he held that "the most appropriate consequence is to strike the papers in which plaintiff cited fraudulent caselaw," because the only cases she relied on in both her motion and her opposition were "those imagined by AI." He denied her summary judgment motion and struck the submissions containing the false citations, which left her opposition to the defendants' cross-motion not before the court. He considered and declined a monetary fine, citing the weight of the sanction imposed, her pro se status, and the caselaw, and cautioned her that any authorities she cites "must be ones she has reviewed, and not those produced by artificial intelligence." The defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was also denied on the merits, as was Gully's separate motion to strike the bill of particulars, and trial was kept on the June 24, 2026 calendar.
Why does Gully v. Varghese matter for law firms using AI?
Justice Weinstein’s decision describes a pro se litigant’s reliance on fabricated authority as sanctionable frivolous conduct, citing the Third Department’s January 2026 decision in Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v Le Tennier that the “submission of fabricated legal authorities is completely without merit in law and therefore constitutes frivolous conduct.” The plaintiff’s explanation that the citations were wrong “unbeknownst to her” did not help: the court read it as “essentially an acknowledgment that she did not read or otherwise check the legal authorities she cited to the Court,” and took judicial notice that a simple Google search for the case names would have shown the real cases addressed entirely different issues.
The remedy was calibrated to the litigant. The court imposed the sanction under its inherent power to address actions that undermine the truth-seeking function of the judicial system (Williams v Scafidi). Because the three invented cases were “the only cases on which plaintiff relies” in both her motion and her opposition, striking those papers disposed of her motion without a fine. The court explained in a footnote that it was holding her to the same standards of conduct as any other party while taking her unrepresented status into account in choosing the sanction.
The court also held the defendants to their own burden. Striking the plaintiff’s opposition did not relieve them of making a prima facie case on their cross-motion, and they failed to do so because they pointed only to gaps in her proof and offered no competent evidence of the boundary line. Firms documenting compliance may wish to consider that exposing an opponent’s fabricated citations does not substitute for the moving party’s own showing.
Implications for your firm
Operational steps a firm reading this case may wish to consider documenting. Strategic and rule-application calls belong to your firm's attorneys.
- Verify authorities cited by a pro se adversary. Defense counsel's reply affirmation flagged the nonexistent cases, and the court then struck the submissions relying on them.
- Consider the non-monetary remedies available. Here the court treated striking the papers as the sanction and found a fine unnecessary.
- Review whether stricken papers leave a party without opposition. Here striking the memorandum left plaintiff's opposition to the cross-motion not before the court, although the cross-motion still failed on the merits.