Dennison v. Caudill
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division · S.D. Ind. · Indiana bar guidance
Conduct
A pro se plaintiff cited a Seventh Circuit case the court could not find and mischaracterized two Indiana statutes in his complaint.
Consequence
No sanction. Here the court declined to order a Rule 11 show-cause because it dismissed the complaint, but warned of sanctions for future filings.
Lesson
Here the court used IFP screening to flag an unfindable citation and point a pro se filer to its AI-certification notice before any sanction.
Verified September 28, 2026
- Citation
- Dennison v. Caudill, No. 2:26-cv-00255-JRO-MKK, Order Granting Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dismissing Complaint, and Order to Show Cause (S.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2026) (Olson, J.), ECF No. 9
- Decided
- April 23, 2026
Summary
Philip D. Dennison, proceeding pro se, sued a Title IV-D prosecutor, the Indiana Department of Child Services, and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles over a driver's license suspension and a later state-court infraction conviction for driving while suspended. Screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), District Judge Justin R. Olson noted that Dennison cited "Coleman v. Hudson, 682 F3d 775 (7th Cir. 2012)" for the proposition that procedural due-process violations are actionable under Section 1983 absent notice or a hearing, and wrote: "The Court can find no such case." The court also reviewed the two Indiana Code sections Dennison relied on to argue that a Title IV-D prosecutor is limited to civil child-support enforcement and found that neither statute imposes that limit (one defines "delinquent"; the other authorizes the appointment of certain assistants). The court stated it was "not convinced the specific legal contentions contained in the complaint comply with Rule 11(b)'s requirement."
- AI tool:
- Unidentified (the order reports a case citation the court could not find and mischaracterized statutes, and directs the plaintiff to the court's AI-disclosure notice, but does not find that AI was used)
What did the court warn about?
The court granted Dennison leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Rooker-Feldman, Eleventh Amendment and prosecutorial immunity, standing, and mootness), with leave to file an amended complaint by May 25, 2026. On the citations, the court noted it could order Dennison to show cause under Rule 11(c) but, because the complaint was dismissed in its entirety, would not do so "at this time"; Dennison was instead "warned of the possibility of sanctions if any future filings violate Rule 11(b)." The court also pointed him to its April 13, 2026 supplemental notice to pro se litigants on artificial intelligence (Dkt. 8), which, with the court's Practices and Procedures, requires litigants who use AI to include a signed certification identifying the tool and attesting to independent review of all cited authority, and warned that a filing that does not follow the policy, "including a document citing fake cases or mischaracterizing statutes, may result in appropriate sanctions up to and including dismissal of the case or a default judgment against the offending party." No sanction was imposed.
Why does Dennison v. Caudill matter for law firms using AI?
Dennison is a screening order, and the citation problem is a secondary thread in it. Judge Olson dismissed the complaint for jurisdictional reasons that had nothing to do with the citations: Rooker-Feldman barred review of the state-court conviction, the state agencies were immune, the prosecutor had absolute immunity from damages, Dennison lacked standing for prospective relief, and the license suspension had already been lifted. The Rule 11 discussion appears in a separate section addressed to the amended complaint Dennison was invited to file.
The court’s handling is measured. It identified one case of which it wrote, “The Court can find no such case,” and two statutes that did not support the proposition Dennison attributed to them, said it was “not convinced” the legal contentions complied with Rule 11(b), and explained that it could order a show-cause and that sanctions could include a penalty or involuntary dismissal. It then declined to do so because the complaint was already being dismissed, and warned instead. The order does not say the citation came from AI.
The AI component is procedural. The court noted that Dennison filed before knowing which judge would preside, and pointed him to the April 13, 2026 supplemental notice and the judge’s Practices and Procedures, reproducing the required certification text. For practitioners, the order shows a chambers-level AI certification requirement being attached to a specific pro se litigant at the screening stage, with the warning tied expressly to “fake cases” and mischaracterized statutes.
Implications for your firm
Operational steps a firm reading this case may wish to consider documenting. Strategic and rule-application calls belong to your firm's attorneys.
- Review how a court's AI-disclosure notice is tracked once a matter is assigned. Here the judge had entered a supplemental AI notice on the docket (Dkt. 8) and restated its certification text in the screening order.
- Verify statutory characterizations as well as case citations. The court read the two cited Indiana Code sections itself and found they did not say what the complaint claimed.
- Note that the court treated the unfindable case and the statutory misreading together as a Rule 11(b) concern, and reserved sanctions for any future filing.
Sources
Primary sources
- AI attribution: the order does not find or state that Dennison used AI. It flags a case the court could not find and a statutory mischaracterization, then reminds him of the court's AI-disclosure notice. Treating the citation as an AI hallucination is a Charlotin tracker inference, not a finding in the order.