D'Ambrosio v. Meta Platforms Inc.

What sanction did the court impose?

The May 15 opinion affirmed, ordered D'Ambrosio, Walner and Marc Trent to show cause why the court should not impose fees and double costs for frivolously appealing as to the Rajalas, a fine against Walner "for misrepresentations of law in the section of the opening brief concerning the Doxing Act claim," and a fine against Trent for statements at oral argument, and sent the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. In a July 21, 2026 order the panel found the Rajalas' requested fees reasonable, rejected any reduction because their lawyers served pro bono, and awarded $6,712.50 in fees and $1,285.10 in double costs ($7,997.60) under Rule 38, jointly and severally against D'Ambrosio, Walner, and "the law firm for which Walner worked, Trent Law Firm P.C." Because Walner "did not respond to our show-cause order to dispute that he engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the bar, to offer factors in mitigation, or to request a hearing," the court fined him $5,000 under Rule 46(c) without further proceedings. It discharged the show-cause as to Trent's oral-argument statements, citing "the adequacy of the other sanctions imposed and attorney Trent's last-minute substitute appearance for oral argument."

Why does D'Ambrosio v. Meta Platforms Inc. matter for law firms using AI?

The Seventh Circuit’s May 15 opinion affirms on the merits and then turns to the brief. Judge Hamilton wrote that the court sees “such sloppy work in briefs fairly often, and almost always let it pass without comment,” but the Doxing Act section “seemed to have the highest density” of problems. The opinion walks through them in order: a statutory definition quoted from the wrong section and not quite accurately, an unsupported claim about what Illinois courts “have consistently recognized,” a quotation attributed to FTC v. Accusearch Inc. whose key words “do not appear in the opinion,” a misstated liability standard, and quoted “legislative findings” that the court could not locate in the statute, the session law, or any public version of the bill.

The court linked the errors to AI but did not rest on that link. It said they “bear the hallmarks of the misuse of generative artificial intelligence” and pointed to the Trent Law Firm website’s promotion of AI, then continued “[w]ithout making any broad judgments about the use of artificial intelligence for help in drafting briefs, however, regardless of how these particular errors came about,” quoting the Nebraska Supreme Court’s statement in Prososki v. Regan that “submission of a brief with numerous fictitious citations and quotations is a serious dereliction of counsel’s duty to serve as an officer of the court.” In its own words, the court added that “[s]ubmitting fictitious quotations to a court, regardless of how they are generated, is obviously inconsistent with the standards of conduct this court expects from attorneys practicing in this court and the standards of appellate briefing imposed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.”

The July 21 order resolved the show-cause on the three tracks the opinion had set out. On frivolousness, it awarded the Rajalas their fees and double costs and made the law firm, not Trent individually, jointly and severally liable with D’Ambrosio and Walner, rejecting any reduction because the Rajalas’ lawyers had served pro bono: “The willingness of those attorneys to serve pro bono should not work for the benefit of those who are being sanctioned for misconduct in the litigation.” On the brief, Walner’s silence decided the matter: he did not dispute the charge, offer mitigation, or request a hearing, and the court imposed a $5,000 fine under Rule 46(c), citing a prior Seventh Circuit decision imposing the same amount “for similar briefing errors and hallucinations but declining to suspend or terminate bar admission.” On Trent’s oral-argument statements, the court discharged the show-cause.